Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
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OFFICE OF THE CLERK

No.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Alicja Matczak, et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

J.J. Dahl, et al.,

Respondents.

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Eleventh Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Alicja Matczak & Tadeusz Bohdziun
4725-B Coquina Key Drive S.E.
Saint Petersburg, Fl 33705
Tel. (727) 896-2106

Pro Se Petitioners

THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether denying by U.S. Court Of Appeals For The Eleventh Circuit petitioners "Motion to Determine Appealability of the Last Order Filed and Entered in the District Court on May 16, 2000." abridged petitioners right "to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." as provided by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and denied the equal protection of the laws as provided by Section 1 of Fourteen Amendment to the U.S. Constitution?

2. Whether forbidding petitioner Alicja Matczak by police officer to take photographs of criminal acts being committed under police officers supervision constitutes abridging the freedom of speech, and of the press as provided by the First and Fourteen Amendment to the U.S. Constitution?

3. Whether keeping firearm in assault and ambush situation to protect lives, bodily integrity, home and agriculture business under construction and to terminate and prevent forcible felony as prescribed by State of Florida Constitution and Statutes, constitutes criminal offence under Second and Fourteen Amendment to the U.S. Constitution?

4. Whether warrantless, fruitless and unreasonable search and seizure of petitioner Alicja Matczak just because she entered her own home and agriculture business under construction violated Fourth and Fourteen Amendment to the U.S. Constitution?

5. Whether warrantless, fruitless and unreasonable search and seizure of petitioner Tadeusz Bohdziun while burglarizing and aiding felony teft and trespassing on construction site violated Fourth and Fourteen Amendment to the U.S. Constitution?

6. Whether produced some hours later and after unreasonable search and seizure, several times corruptly false, hand written and unreadable "Arrest Affidavit" violates the Fourth, Sixth and Fourteen Amendment to the U.S. Constitution?

7. Whether reversing by force, terminated attempted willful and hostile felony trespass, constitutes deprivation of real estate property without due process of law as provided by the Fifth and Fourteen Amendment to the U.S. Constitution?

8. Whether continuos use of petitioners private apron and part of the property, authorized by Lake County, police officers and prosecutor, constitutes taking of private real estate property for public use, without just compensation as provided by the Fifth and Fourteen Amendment to the U.S. Constitution?

9. Whether taking 5 acres without just compensation by maintaining for over 38 years false records, constitutes deprivation of real estate property and taking private real estate property for public use without just compensation as provided by the Fifth and Fourteen Amendment to the U.S. Constitution?

10. Whether denying continuously any and all use of the real estate property and continuously refusing to issue Building Permit and causing

Agriculture Business, self employment and income loses more than $600000 and mounting, constitutes deprivation and taking of private real estate property without just compensation as provided by the Fifth and Fourteen Amendment to the U.S. Constitution?

11. Whether malicious prosecution based on several times corruptly false and without any cause "arrest affidavit" and "intend to prosecute" of felony trespasser, for preventing and terminating assault, ambush and felony trespass violates Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteen Amendment to the U.S. Constitution?

12. Whether U.S. District Courts', Middle District Of Florida, Ocala Division Order Dismissing Complaint violated requested by both parties right to trial by jury as provided by the Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and deprived petitioners of "the equal protection of the laws." as provided by the Fourteen Amendment to the U.S. Constitution?

13. Whether Ninth and Fourteen Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides guarantees against malicious prosecution and violations of Human Rights as provided by UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights?

14. Whether Ninth and Fourteen Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides guarantees against malicious prosecution and violations of Human Rights as provided by American Convention on Human Rights?

15. Whether arbitrarily converting rights into crimes and crimes into rights by police officers and prosecutor without Legislative Due Process of Law violates Ninth and Fourteen Amendments to the U.S. Constitution?

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Alicja Matczak, Petitioner
Tadeusz Bohdziun, Petitioner

J.J. Dahl, Respondent
Rhonda H. Gerber, Respondent
William "Bill" H. Good, Respondent
Richard Swartz, Respondent
Catherine C. Hanson, Respondent
Welton G. Cadwell, Respondent
George Knupp, Jr., Respondent
Ken Adams, Respondent
John Guzman, Respondent

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

There is no parent or publicly held company owning 10% or more of the corporation's stock.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED . . . . . i, ii, iii, iv

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING v

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT v

TABLE OF CONTENTS vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . vii, viii

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI 1

OPINIONS BELOW 1

JURISDICTION 1-2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED 2-4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 4-12

ARGUMENT 12-25

CONCLUSION 25-26

TABLE OF CITATION

Page

Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) 16

Allgeyer v. State of Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) . 23

Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946) 15

Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) 15

Bond v. United States, 000 U.S. 98-9349 (2000) 15

Brower v. Inyo County, 489 U.S. 593 (1989) 15

Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927) 15

Catlin v. U.S., 324 U.S. 229 (1945) 13

Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) 13

Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821) 25

Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974) 13

Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) 20

First Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) 17

Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927) 15

Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971) 16

Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 21

Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
444 U.S. 164 (1979) 16,17,19

Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
505 U. S. 1003, (1992) 18

Marshal v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422 (1983) 23

Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services,
436 U.S. 658 (1978) 21, 22

Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) 15

Owen v. City of Independence,
445 U.S. 622 (1980) 21

Portsmouth Co. v. United States,
260 U.S. 327 (1922) 17

Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) 20

Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334 (1941) 23

Thornhill v. State of Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) . . 14

Thompson v. I.N.S., 375 U.S. 384 (1964) 13

United States v. Causby,
328 U.S. 256, 265 (1946) 17,19

United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253 (1980) 20

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioners, Alicja Matczak & Tadeusz Bohdziun respectfully pray that a writ of certiorari be issued to review the judgment of the United States Court Of Appeals For The Eleventh Circuit dismissing petitioners Appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

OPINIONS BELOW

The order of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction is not reported and is reprinted in the appendix to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Pet. App. 1-2.The order of the United States District Court, Middle District Of Florida, Ocala Division dismissing petitioners original Complaint for failure to state a claim is not yet reported and is reprinted in the appendix to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Pet. App. 2-10. The three subsequent orders of the United States District Court, Middle District Of Florida, Ocala Division denying New Trial are not yet reported and are reprinted in the Appendix to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Pet. App. 10-14.

JURISDICTION

The order of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction was entered on December 19, 2000. Pet. App. 1-2.

Petitioners invoke this Court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) that in pertinent part provides that this Court may exercise certiorari jurisdiction "[o]r where any title,

right, privilege, or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution or the treaties or statutes of, or any commission held or authority exercised under, the United States."

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES INVOLVED

This case puts in issue several Amendments to the United States Constitution, which provide as follows:

The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides, in pertinent part, that: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances".

The Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides, in pertinent part, that: "the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."

The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."

The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that: " No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval

forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."

The Seventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that: " In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, then according to the rules of the common law."

The Ninth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people"

The Fourteen Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, Section 1 provides that "All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

Pursuant to this Court's Rule 14.1(f), the pertinent provisions of Article 1 through Article 12 and Article 17 of United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by United States on December 10, 1948 are reprinted in Pet. App. 30-32. The pertinent provisions of Article 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 18, 21, 24, and Article 25 of The American Convention on Human Rights of The Charter of the Organization of American States signed and ratified by United States on June 15, 1951 are reprinted in Pet. App. 24-30. The pertinent provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254(1), 1257(a), 1291, 1292, 2072 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 are reprinted in Pet. App. 14-23. The pertinent provisions of Rule 38(a), 54(a) and 55 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are reprinted in Pet. App. 23-24. The pertinent provisions of Section 2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 12, 21, 22 and Section 23 of State of Florida Constitution are reprinted in Pet. App. 33-35. The pertinent provisions of State of Florida Statutes, Sections 790.25, 776.012, 776.031, 776.08, 810.09, 812.012, 812.014, 839.25 are reprinted in Pet. App. 35-48.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On December 23,1997 petitioners finalized real estate transaction on 14,2 acre residential vacant lot zoned agriculture, located on County Road 474 in rural Lake County in Florida, with the owner Jean Nicchiarico residing at 29 Chalburn Rd, West Redding, State of Connecticut. Jean Nicchiarico owned the property for over 25 years. *See Exhibit 2.* Century 21 Realty Services, Inc. of Clermont, Florida offered property for sale and Clermont attorney handled closing at Law Office of Mr.Leonard H. Baird, JR. Owner Jean Nicchiarico attended closing by mail and was represented by two Century 21 Realty Services,

Inc. associates, Melba McDonald and Nancy J. Cini. Petitioners bought the property subject to intrusion, hostile trespass and possibly attempted adverse possession or hijacking. *See Exhibit 1-37.*

There is public easement approximately 36739 square feet or 0.84 acre dedicated to Lake County for County Road 474.*See Exhibit 5.* This is recorded right-of-way and Lake County holds good and valid deed to the easement. There is also private apron from the paved County Road 474 to the property over the ditch that runs parallel to the paved County Road 474. Frontage of the property is fenced and there is a gate at the apron. Property was sold "as is" with the fence and the gate. The fence and the gate are located on Lake County owned property, specifically on the land constituting the dedicated easement or right of way. *See Exhibit 12.* The deed was recorded December 30,1997 at 8.34am.*See Exhibit 1.* Notice of Possession was given by recording the deed. On December 23,1997 after closing petitioner, Tadeusz Bohdziun went from City of Clermont where the closing took place to the property to inspect it. However petitioner, Tadeusz Bohdziun could not enter his property, because somebody placed metal chain and padlocks on the gate and lock petitioners out of their own property. *See Exhibit 32, 33.* One of individuals, who lock out petitioners out of their own property is Mark Chodos residing at 10411 C.R. 474,Clermont, FL.34711. Mark Chodos also placed his mailbox in front of petitioners apron within public easement. Post Office delivers mail to this mailbox to Mark Chodos. Mark Chodos' official mailing address is assign to his 5-acre lot No. 28 which fronts 660 feet on paved County Road 474 and is located to the east of petitioners property. However there is no apron over the ditch to his property because he prefers to intrude and trespass on petitioners property. *See Exhibit 7, 37.*

There are also several other lots in this area, which appear to be land locked but they are not, because there is legal easement which starts and runs on property line of lot No. 27 and most likely takes care of everybody in the back. What it takes is to clear it and to build the apron.

Petitioner, Tadeusz Bohdziun called Mark Chodos over the phone and informed him that he is new owner of the property and asked Mark Chodos for the key to the padlock. Mark Chodos refused to provide the key, and stated that he does not care what petitioner, Tadeusz Bohdziun bought if anything. Mark Chodos stated that the place where the apron and the gate are located is separate lot own by Lake County. Mark Chodos stated that he is authorized by Lake County to care for this property. Mark Chodos cited Official Assessment Maps of Lake County where the apron area of petitioners property is shown as 2.5-acre lot No. 24 and is shown as separate property.

Petitioner, Tadeusz Bohdziun advised Mark Chodos that the map is incorrect and requested that Mark Chodos removes his chain and his padlock from the gate and remove his mail box from the front of the gate. Mark Chodos refused and stated that he and individual named Darrell are very good with guns and petitioner may get shot, if petitioner, Tadeusz Bohdziun attempts to enter petitioners own property. Petitioner, Alicja Matczak witnessed the conversation, however conversation was not taped, because petitioners did not expect to receive death threats or any other threats at all. Mark Chodos also made some other threats directed rather at the property, which were recorded by petitioners telephone answering machine and are available for the review. Petitioner, Tadeusz Bohdziun made several attempts to inspect and enter his Home and Agriculture Business but could not enter for over 45 days because hostile

trespassers and hijackers would not remove padlocks and chain from the gate. He also sent several complaint-inquiry letters to various Lake County Departments, complained in person and in writing but achieved nothing. *See Record Excerpts 1.*

On December 30,1997 petitioner, Tadeusz Bohdziun applied for Building Permit to install mobile home and to start agriculture business. Lake County Zoning Department approved petitioners Plot Plan and Lake County Health Department charged petitioners $250 for Septic Tank Permit what placed the property under "Construction site" status. *See Exhibit 9, 10.* Petitioner, Tadeusz Bohdziun purchased in the retail store registered firearm, like any other person in State of Florida just in case that the death threats become reality. Petitioners also purchased building material and "No Trespassing" signs to fence the property and to terminate trespass. On February 07, 1998, petitioners went to the property to inspect it for the first time and to fence it. Upon arrival at the property in the morning, petitioners installed two "No Trespassing" signs on the posts of the gate and then petitioner Tadeusz Bohdziun cut the chain with electric drill in order to enter petitioners own Home and Agriculture Business. *See Exhibit 12, 13, 17.* Petitioners constructed approximately 150-200 feet or more of single line barbed wire fence and installed third "No Trespassing" sign across visible trespassing path. *See Exhibit 14, 21, 30, 31.*

First intruder who came to trespass on petitioners property ignoring "No Trespassing" signs was a woman named Trilby Burket residing at 4710 Nantucket Lane, Orlando, FL 32808. *See Exhibit16,17, 22, 23, 29.* She left because the newly installed fence prevented her from going on others people property, but like become clear later, she did not call police but rather went to mobilize other intruders to assault and

ambush petitioners. Approximately 30 minutes later petitioners were ambush and assaulted by Darrell Judy and other intruders and trespassers who came with clear intention to inflict bodily harm on petitioners. *See Exhibit 18, 19, 20.* Darrell Judy was enraged and was verbally assaulting petitioners, because he did not like the fact that petitioners entered and were fencing their own property. Petitioner, Tadeusz Bohdziun advised Darrell Judy several times, to leave the property and when he refused and was still raging at petitioners it became necessary to defend lives, bodily integrity and to terminate trespass upon "Construction Site" of Home and Agriculture Business with support of keeping firearm in accordance with State of Florida Constitution and Laws. It was the firearm that saved and protected petitioners from being beaten up or killed in remote wooded area.

Darrell Judy stopped raging and went back to his truck, turn around and left through the front gate and headed westbound on Country Road 474. He pulled to the shoulder and stopped his truck by the bushes little west of the gate where the other assailants were hiding in ambush, got out of his truck, pulled his firearm and fired it once from public road in what petitioners believe was petitioners direction. Subsequently Darrell Judy got back to his track and fled westbound on Country Road 474 probably picking up other assailants. Petitioners were not hit by the fired round and took cover behind their van. After a while petitioners picked up tools and locked their own Home And Agriculture Business under construction with their own chain and numeric padlock and went to nearest gas station 6 miles away to call police and report intrusion and assault. *See Exhibit 34.* After calling 911 petitioners met with unidentified Lake

County Sheriff Department officer at the gas station who directed petitioners to go back to the property but would not go with petitioners, simply sending them into another ambush. Petitioners drove back to the property and upon arrival find that the chain on the gate was cut and laying on the ground and the two " No Trespassing" and "Posted" signs were torn down and stolen. There were three Lake County Sheriff Department officers with Mark Chodos and Trilby Burket jointly trespassing and burglarizing petitioners Home and Agriculture Business under construction. Without one word of explanation, what they are doing in petitioners Home and Agriculture Business under construction with intruders and trespassers, petitioners were searched and seized and the van was searched too. Fruitless search produced petitioner Tadeusz Bohdziun registered firearm that is normal safety equipment in every second home and place of business in State of Florida and which was where it should be, at petitioners Home and Agriculture Business. Furthermore the registered firearm was available for any inspection all the time and there was no any need to search for it. The three Lake County Sheriff Department officers removed from petitioners van the chain with interlocking padlocks and returned it to trespassers just like that and disposed of evidence of attempted adverse possession or hijacking.
The intruders and trespassers decided to call on the telephone Darrell Judy to come back to petitioners Home and Agriculture Business under construction to trespass and while trespassing to fill out "Intend to prosecute" form. *See Exhibit 22, 23, 24, 25.* The trespassers while waiting for Darrell Judy started to demolish and steal newly installed fence and third "No trespassing" sign under strict Lake County Sheriff Department officers' supervision. *See Exhibit 30,31.*

While demolition and stealing of the fence was underway, Lake County Sherrif Department officers released petitioner, Alicja Matczak from imprisonment in police squad car. They were asking several times, what nationality petitioners are. Petitioner, Alicja Matczak informed the officers that petitioners are from Poland. After questioning petitioner, Alicja Matczak about petitioners national origin the three respondents, Lake County Sherrif Department officers told petitioner, Alicja Matczak that petitioners do not own the property and are not allowed to fence it. Petitioner, Alicja Matczak presented respondent, John Guzman with the copy of the Recorded Deed and copy of Lake County approved development Plot Plan. The three respondents, Lake County Sherrif Department officers examined the documents and told petitioner, Alicja Matczak that they can not read the deed and Plot Plan.

Darrell Judy arrived back approximately 20 to 30 minutes later in different cloths and in different truck without his firearm with some boy. With a lot of help Darrell Judy attempted to write something, which supposed to be complaint against petitioner, Tadeusz Bohdziun. Respondent, John Guzman, converted this attempted writing to a criminal offence of Aggravated Assault with a Deadly Weapon. Deputy John Guzman came back to his squad car and told Petitioner, Tadeusz Bohdziun that Petitioner, Tadeusz Bohdziun is arrested and read petitioner, Tadeusz Bohdziun his rights. Subsequently respondent, John Guzman drove petitioner, Tadeusz Bohdziun to Lake County Jail where petitioner, Tadeusz Bohdziun was booked for Aggravated Assault with Deadly Weapon charges. Petitioner, Alicja Matczak took the photo camera and started taking pictures but she was able to take a few only because respondent, John Guzman strictly forbidden her to take any pictures. Petitioner, Alicja

Matczak was ordered by the respondent, John Guzman to leave the property and go back to rented apartment, while the armed real estate property hijackers were continuing with demolition and stealing of the fence.

On March 23,1998 Petitioner, Tadeusz Bohdziun has been charged with Aggravated Assault with Deadly Weapon charge by Assistant State Attorney J.J. Dahl. Case Number 98-265-CF-A-JL. Assistant State Attorney J.J. Dahl filed the charges in the Fifth Judicial Circuit of the State of Florida against petitioner, Tadeusz Bohdziun under false name of Tadeusz Bohdzium and false social security number of 319762531. Petitioner's, Tadeusz Bohdziun Social Security Number is 319-76-2523.
On July 20, 1998 petitioner, Tadeusz Bohdziun was scheduled to appear before the judge. Ten minutes before appearing before the judge, petitioner, Tadeusz Bohdziun was presented with second PLEA WAIVER AND CONSENT and was coerced to plead guilty to a charge of Improper Exhibition of Firearm, Section 790.10 Florida Statutes. Petitioner, Tadeusz Bohdziun was coerced to plead guilty due to the fact that petitioner, Tadeusz Bohdziun acts do not constitute any illegal or criminal act at all under State of Florida Constitution and laws and under United States Constitution. Petitioner, Tadeusz Bohdziun sentence reads a follows:

A. ADJUDICATION: The Court will adjudicate me guilty.

B. SENTENCE: I will be placed on Supervised Probation for a period of one (1) year; I will forfeit my gun:
I will attend and complete a gun safety class; I will have no victim contact; and I will pay $150.00 in fines

and court costs. The State will dismiss the Aggravated Assault with a Deadly Weapon charge.

1) PROGRAM PARTICIPATION: I will attend and complete a gun safety class as stated in section "B" above.
C. FINES AND COSTS: I will pay $150.00 in fines and court costs as stated in section "B" above.

Petitioner, Tadeusz Bohdziun served the sentence and complied with every requirement and condition of the sentence.

The main issue in this case is grave violation of basic Constitutional and Human Rights and taking of substantial real estate property and depravation of all uses of property and enormous depravation and loss of self employment and income.

ARGUMENT

This case is a petition to the Government for a redress of grievances specifically outlined in the Constitutional questions presented for review and discussed in greater detail below in this petition.

This Court's review of the order of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction is warranted because it refused to decide an important question of federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by this Court and "decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court." Sup. Ct. R. 10(c). When the United States District Court, Middle District Of Florida, Ocala Division dismissed original Complaint filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, for failure to

state a claim without leave to amend, petitioners did not consider it "final" decision because it violated Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury requested by both parties. *See* Rule 38(a) Fed. R. Civ. P., Pet. App. 24.

This Court clarify this right in *Curtis v. Loether,* 415 U.S. 189 (1974) and said: ["W] hat ever doubt may have existed should now be dispelled. The Seventh Amendment does apply to actions enforcing statutory rights, and requires a jury trial upon demand, if the statute creates legal rights and remedies, enforceable in an action for damages in the ordinary courts of law." In doing so petitioners relied on this Court statement in *Catlin v. U.S.,* 324 U.S. 229 (1945) where this Court said that: [A] 'final decision' generally is one which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." and on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292(a)(1), 2072 that provide jurisdiction for appeals from practically any District Court order as does Rule 54(a) Fed. R. Civ. P. and Article 8 of American Convention on Human Rights. This Court reaffirmed this principle in *Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,* 337 U.S. 541 (1949) and in *Thompson v. I.N.S.,* 375 U.S. 384 (1964).

Petitioners filed "Motion to Determine Appealability of the Last Order Filed and Entered in the District Court on May 16, 2000," but the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit avoided the question and denied the motion, which if granted would show Appeals Court jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1291 or §1292(a)(1). Petitioners believe that they were entitled to Judiciary created "exception appeal" like anybody else pursuant to "the equal protection of the laws." clause of Fourteen Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

The United States District Court, Middle District Of Florida, Ocala Division also deprived petitioners of "Judgment by default" as provided by Rule 55(a),(b)(1) Fed. R. Civ. P., and "the equal protection of the laws" clause of Fourteen Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

Whether forbidding petitioner Alicja Matczak by police officer to take photographs constitutes abridging the freedom of speech, and of the press, is best answered in this Court opinion in *Thornhill v. State of Alabama*, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) where this Court said:

"The freedom of speech and of the press, which are secured by the First Amendment against abridgment by the United States, are among the fundamental personal rights and liberties which are secured to all persons by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by a state. 7"[1] and reaffirmed it over and over again in to many cases to quote. If the rights enumerated in the First Amendment are secured against abridgment by the United States, then it is obvious that any other Amendments are secured against abridgement by the United States as well pursuant to the "equal protection of the laws" clause of the Fourteen Amendment.

Whether warrantless, fruitless and unreasonable search and seizure of petitioners just because they entered their own home and agriculture

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[1] [Footnote 7] Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160 , 60 S.Ct. 146, 150; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 , 58 S.Ct. 666, 668; De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 , 57 S.Ct. 255; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 , 56 S.Ct. 444, 446; Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 , 51 S.Ct. 625, 627; Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 , 51 S.Ct. 532, 535, 73 A.L.R. 1484; Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 , 45 S.Ct. 625, 629. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 , 327 S., 58 S. Ct. 149, 152.

business under construction violated Fourth and Fourteen Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is best answered by this Court *in Monroe v. Pape,* 365 U.S. 167 (1961) *and Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents*, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) where this Court held police and federal agents liable for violating provisions of U.S. Constitution. The "probable cause" clause of Fourth Amendment still requires police officers to obtain search Warrant before they can search as this Court held: "in Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927), the petitioner was convicted on the basis of evidence seized under a warrant issued, without probable cause under the Fourth Amendment, by a state court judge for a state law offense." and in *Gambino v. United States,* 275 U.S. 310 (1927), and reversed petitioners' convictions as having been based upon evidence obtained through an unconstitutional search and seizure, and in *Bond v. United States, 000 U.S. 98-9349 (2000)* reversed drug case because of illegal search. Furthermore this Court not only reversed convictions but clearly stated that: "Of course, the Fourth Amendment does not in so many words provide for its enforcement by an award of money damages for the consequences of its violation. but "it is . . . well settled that where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done." Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S., at 684 (footnote omitted)." As far as illegal seizure goes, petitioners are relying on this Courts' definition of illegal seizure in *Brower v. Inyo County*, 489 U.S. 593 (1989) where this Court Held: ["1.] Consistent with the language, history, and judicial construction of the Fourth Amendment, a seizure occurs when governmental termination of a person's movement is effected through means intentionally applied". Lake County Sheriff officers not

only illegally and intentionally seized petitioners, but deprived them of their rights to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, while aiding malicious and extremely hostile thieves and trespassers.

The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides in pertinent part that: "nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." Respondents already deprived petitioners of substantial real estate property and other fundamental Constitutional and Human rights closely associated and related to real estate property rights. Respondents and trespassers converted trespassing path into illegal easement or right of way without due process of law but excluded and deprived petitioners of a right to enter their own home and agriculture business for over 45 days and this Court addressed the issue in *Griffin v. Breckenridge,* 403 U.S. 88 (1971) and held violators liable under 42 U.S.C. §1985(3).

This Court in *Adderley v. Florida,* 385 U.S. 39 (1966) clearly upheld basic property "right to exclude", which if violated constitutes criminal trespass and upheld 107 convictions of trespass allowing the armed owner to use criminal law to protect his property. Additionally this Court clearly recognized " right to exclude" as a property right which cannot be taken without compensation. In *Kaiser Aetna v. United States*, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) this Court said: "In this case, we hold that the "right to exclude," so universally held to be a fundamental element of [444 U.S. 164, 180] the property right, 11 falls within this category of

interests that the Government cannot take without compensation."[2] In petitioners case, respondents not only continuously denying petitioners "right to exclude" but prosecuted them for exercising it and used trespassers to prosecute petitioners while trespassing. This is obvious violation of Fifth and Fourteen Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Furthermore, respondents attempted to convert trespassing path into illegal easement, but again this Court in *Kaiser Aetna v. United States*, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) said: " And even if the Government physically invades only an easement in property, it must nonetheless pay just compensation. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 265 (1946); Portsmouth Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922)." Petitioners believe that the "right to exclude" includes use of private apron for entrance purpose and does not include sidewalk part not relevant in this case, because there is no sidewalk in this case. Apron is private because is sold with the property and in some point in time, one of property owners in chain of title was required to pay for permit and construction.

Whether continuos refusal for over 3 years and mounting to issue or deny building permit for petitioners home and agriculture business and denying any and all use of petitioners real estate property, constitutes regulatory taking is best answered by this Court in *First Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County*, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) where the Court Held: "[2]. Under the Just Compensation Clause,

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[2] [Footnote 11] See, e. g., United States v. Pueblo of San Ildefonso, 206 Ct. Cl. 649, 669-670, 513 F.2d 1383, 1394 (1975); United States v. Lutz, 295 F.2d 736, 740 (CA5 1961). As stated by Mr. Justice Brandeis, "[a]n essential element of individual property is the legal right to exclude others from enjoying it." International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (dissenting opinion).

where the government has "taken" property by a land-use regulation, the landowner may recover damages for the time before it is finally determined that the regulation constitutes a "taking" of his property. The Clause is designed not to limit the governmental interference with property rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking. A landowner is entitled to bring an action in inverse condemnation as a result of the self-executing character of the constitutional provision with respect to compensation. While the typical taking occurs when the government acts to condemn property in the exercise of its power of eminent domain, the doctrine of inverse condemnation is predicated on the proposition that a taking may occur without such formal proceedings. "Temporary" regulatory takings which, as here, deny a landowner all use of his property, are not different in kind from permanent takings for which the Constitution clearly requires compensation. Once a court determines that a taking has occurred, the government retains the whole range of options already available - amendment of the regulation, withdrawal of the invalidated regulation, or exercise of eminent domain. But where the government's activities have already worked a taking of all use of property, no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the period during which the taking was effective. Invalidation of the ordinance without payment of fair value for the use of the property during such period would be a constitutionally insufficient remedy. Pp. 314-322."
In *Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,*
505 U. S. 1003, (1992) this Court provided definition for regulatory taking going too far and said:

"In 70-odd years of succeeding "regulatory takings" jurisprudence, we have generally eschewed

any "`set formula'" for determining how far is too far, preferring to "engag[e] in . . . essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries." Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (quoting Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)). See Epstein, Takings: Descent and Resurrection, 1987 S.Ct. Rev. 1, 4. We have, however, described at least two discrete categories of regulatory action as compensable without case-specific inquiry into the public interest advanced in support of the restraint. The first encompasses regulations that compel the property owner to suffer a physical "invasion" of his property. In general (at least with regard to permanent invasions), no matter how minute the intrusion, and no matter how weighty the public purpose behind it, we have required compensation. For example, in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), we determined that New York's law requiring landlords to allow television cable companies to emplace cable facilities in their apartment buildings constituted a taking, id., at 435-440, even though the facilities occupied, at most, only 1 1/2 cubic feet of the landlords' property, see id., at 438, n. 16. See also United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 265 , and n. 10 (1946) (physical invasions of airspace); cf. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (imposition of navigational servitude upon private marina). The second situation in which we have found categorical treatment appropriate is where regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land. See Agins, 447 U.S., at 260 ; see also Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 [505 U.S. 1003, 1016] U.S. 264, 295-296 (1981). 6 As we have said on numerous occasions, the Fifth Amendment is violated

when land use regulation "does not substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically viable use of his land." Agins, supra, at 260 (citations omitted) (emphasis added)."
Petitioners in this case are suffering both categories of regulatory taking, which are permanent physical invasions and depravation of all economically beneficial and productive use of land. Petitioner Tadeusz Bohdziun did not consider plain hostile trespass as taking and terminated it, but respondents jointly with trespassers assaulted him and ambushed him and prosecuted him, so right know, nothing left but to execute "inverse condemnation" as described by this Court in *United States v. Clarke*, 445 U.S. 253 (1980) where this Court said: "To accomplish a taking by seizure, on the other hand, a condemning authority need only occupy the land in question. Such a taking thus shifts to the landowner the burden to discover the encroachment and to take affirmative action to recover just compensation."

The respondents do not state any reason, law or regulation on which they base their decision to deny any and all uses of petitioners real estate property and directly causing great agriculture business and self employment loses more then $600000 and mounting.

Whether malicious prosecution based on several times corruptly false and without any cause "arrest affidavit" and "intend to prosecute" of felony trespasser, for preventing and terminating assault, ambush and felony trespass violates Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteen Amendment to the U.S. Constitution?
In *Scheuer v. Rhodes*, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) this Court said: " However, since Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123

(1908), it has been settled that the Eleventh Amendment provides no shield for a state official confronted by a claim that he had deprived another of a federal right under the color of state law. Ex parte Young teaches that when a state officer acts under a state law in a manner violative of the Federal Constitution, he "comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States." Id., at 159-160. (Emphasis supplied.)."

Whether Ninth and Fourteen Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides guarantees against violations of Human Rights as provided by UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights and American Convention on Human Rights is rather obvious because the rights are not enumerated but are "others retained by the people" and because United States of America signed and ratified Charter of the Organization of American States and its American Convention on Human Rights on June 15, 1951.
In the light of above this Court in *Owen v. City of Independence*, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) held:

" A municipality has no immunity from liability under 1983 flowing from its constitutional violations and may not assert the good faith of its officers as a defense to such liability. Pp. 635-658.
(a) By its terms, 1983 "creates a species of tort liability that on its face admits of no immunities." Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 . Its language is absolute and unqualified, and no mention is made of any privileges, immunities, or defenses that may be asserted. Rather, the statute imposes liability upon "every person" (held in Monell v. New York City Dept.

of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 , to encompass municipal corporations) who, under color of state law or custom, "subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." And this expansive sweep of 1983's language is confirmed by its legislative history. Pp. 635-636. [445 U.S. 622, 623]". In this case this Court also inquired into intentions of legislature and said: " Moreover, the congressional debates surrounding the passage of 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13 - the forerunner of 1983 - confirm the expansive sweep of the statutory [445 U.S. 622, 636] language. Representative Shellabarger, the author and manager of the bill in the House, explained in his introductory remarks the breadth of construction that the Act was to receive:

"I have a single remark to make in regard to the rule of interpretation of those provisions of the Constitution under which all the sections of the bill are framed. This act is remedial, and in aid of the preservation of human liberty and human rights. All statutes and constitutional provisions authorizing such statutes are liberally and beneficently construed. It would be most strange and, in civilized law, monstrous were this not the rule of interpretation. As has been again and again decided by your own Supreme Court of the United States, and everywhere else where there is wise judicial interpretation, the largest latitude consistent with the words employed is uniformly given in construing such statutes and constitutional provisions as are meant to protect and defend and give remedies for their wrongs to all the people." Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 68 (1871) (hereinafter Globe App.). "

Whether converting rights into crimes and crimes into rights by police officers and prosecutor

without Legislative Due Process of Law violates Section 1 of Fourteen Amendments to the U.S. Constitution is best answered by this Court in *Allgeyer v. State of Louisiana,* 165 U.S. 578 (1897) where this Court said: "The liberty mentioned in that [Fourteenth] Amendment means not only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties, to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned."

The Ninth and Fourteen Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides specific guarantees against malicious prosecution based on violation of Human and Constitutional Rights and when malicious prosecution was initiated against petitioner, then it left nothing to do but to plead guilty out of fear of malicious prosecution and to minimize punishment. This Court in *Marshal v. Lonberger*, 459 U.S. 422 (1983) said: "It is well established that a plea of guilty cannot be voluntary in the sense that it constitutes an intelligent admission that the accused committed the offense unless the accused has received "real notice of the true nature of the charge against him, the first and most universally recognized requirement of due process.' Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334 (1941), quoted in Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S., at 645 '." Petitioners believe that it is legal to act according to clearly established laws and that makes petitioners immune from any malicious prosecution. Petitioners'. Tadeusz Bohdziun acts were clearly within scope of

below specified laws: Sections 790.25(1), (3), (4), and (5) Florida Statutes clearly provides for lawful use of firearm and in defense of life, home, and property. Section 812.012 (3) defines property as anything of value including real property. Sections 776.012 and 776.031 Florida Statutes clearly provides for lawful use of firearm in self-defense, defense of others and lawful use of firearm to terminate trespass on real estate property and to prevent forcible felony. Section 810.09 Florida Statutes even provides for lawful detention and custody of the armed trespasser for prosecution purposes. Section 2, Article I and Section 8, State of Florida Constitution provide undeniable rights to bear arms and to defend life and liberty and to possess and protect property. Second Amendment to the United States Constitution provides undeniable rights to keep and bear arms. The Ninth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides between others, undeniable Human Rights described in United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by United States on December 10, 1948 and in American Convention on Human Rights signed and ratified on June 15, 1951. Article 9 of American Convention on Human Rights reads as follows:

Article 9. Freedom from Ex Post Facto Laws

"No one shall be convicted of any act or omission that did not constitute a criminal offense, under the applicable law, at the time it was committed. A heavier penalty shall not be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offense was committed. If subsequent to the commission of the offense the law provides for the imposition of a lighter punishment, the guilty person shall benefit therefrom"

Defending petitioners own lives, bodily integrity and homeland is not a crime but a duty and necessity.

The acts of police officers and prosecutor in this case may be best illustrated by hypothetical armed bank robbery of a bank located in wooded and remote area, where arriving police responding to bank tellers call for help, asks bank robbers to fill out "Intend to prosecute" form just because bank tellers happen to be immigrants and arrests them for aggravated assault on "innocent" bank robbers. Then the prosecutor takes over and portraits bank robbers as victims and witnesses and the robbery is irrelevant. It may be so, but the Legislature refers to this kind of action as "Conspiracy to deprive persons of rights" and addresses it in 42 U.S.C. §1983, §1985 and in 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242.

CONCLUSION

In *Cohens v. Virginia,* 19 U.S. 264 (1821) the Chief Justice Marshall said: "The Constitution gives the Supreme Court original jurisdiction in certain enumerated cases, and gives it appellate jurisdiction in all others. Among those in which jurisdiction must be exercised in the appellate [19 U.S. 264, 393] form, are cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States. These provisions of the Constitution are equally obligatory, and are to be equally respected." and where the Chief Justice also said:

"It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should not; but it is equally true that it must take jurisdiction if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure because it approaches the confines of the

Constitution. We cannot pass it by because it is doubtful. With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it if it be brought before us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the Constitution. Questions may occur which we would gladly avoid, but we cannot avoid them. All we can do is to exercise our best judgment and conscientiously to perform our duty. In doing this on the present occasion, we find this tribunal invested with appellate jurisdiction in all cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States. We find no exception to this grant, and we cannot insert one."

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted.

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Pro Se Petitioners

February 25, 2001

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
001362 FEB 28 2001
OFFICE OF THE CLERK

No.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Alicja Matczak, et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

J.J. Dahl, et al.,

Respondents.

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Eleventh Circuit

APPENDIX

TO THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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Pro Se Petitioners

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

United States Court Of Appeals
For The Eleventh Circuit
Order Dismissing Appeal 1-2

United States District Court
Middle District Of Florida
Ocala Division Order Dismissing
Complaint 2-10

United States District Court
Middle District Of Florida
Ocala Division Order
Denying First Motion for New Trial 10-12

United States District Court
Middle District Of Florida
Ocala Division Order
Denying Second Motion for New Trial 12-13

United States District Court
Middle District Of Florida
Ocala Division Order
Denying Third Motion for New Trial 13-14

United States Code 14-23

28 U.S.C. §1254 14
28 U.S.C. §1257 14-15
28 U.S.C. §1291 15
28 U.S.C. §1292 15-18
28 U.S.C. §2072 19

Page
42 U.S.C. §1981 19-20
42 U.S.C. §1982 20
42 U.S.C. §1983 20
42 U.S.C. §1985 20-22
18 U.S.C. §241 22-23
18 U.S.C. §242 23

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23-24

Rule 38 23-24
Rule 54 24
Rule 55 24

American Convention on Human Rights 24-30

Article 1 25
Article 2 25
Article 3 25
Article 4 25
Article 5 25-26
Article 7 26-27
Article 8 27-28
Article 9 28
Article 10 29
Article 11 29
Article 18 29
Article 21 29
Article 24 30
Article 25 30

United Nations
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 30-32

Article 1 30
Article 2 30-31
Article 3 31

Page
Article 4 31
Article 5 31
Article 6 31
Article 7 31
Article 8 31
Article 9 32
Article 10 32
Article 11 32
Article 12 32
Article 17 32

Constitution of the State of Florida 33-35

Section 2 33
Section 4 33
Section 5 33
Section 8 34
Section 9 34
Section 12 34
Section 21 34
Section 22 35
Section 23 35

The 1998 State of Florida Statutes. 35-48

§790.25 35-39
§776.012 39-40
§776.031 40
§776.08 40
§810.09 40-43
§812.012 43-45
§812.014 45-48
§839.25 48

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

NO. 00-13114-BB

ALICJA MATCZAK,
TADEUSZ BOHSZIUN,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

J.J. DAHL,
ROHNDA H. GERBER, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

DEC 19 2000

THOMAS K. HAHN
CLERK

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida

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Before ANDERSON, Chief JUDGE, BIRCH and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.

BY THE COURT:

The appellees' motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction are GRANTED. The appellants' pro se notice of appeal, filed in the district court on June 9,

2000, was untimely because it was not filed within thirty (30) days after the entry of the March 23, 2000, Order denying their motion for reconsideration. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A); Wright v. Preferred Research, Inc., 891 F. 2d 886, 888 (11th Cir. 1990); Wansor v. George Hantscho, Co., 570 F.2d 1202, 1206 n.5 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
The appellants' "Motion to Determine Appealability of the Last Order Filed and Entered in the District Court on May 16, 2000," is DENIED.

FILED
/s/
2000 MAR-6 AM 11:08

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
OCALA DIVISION

ALICJA MATCZAK and
TADEUSZ BOHDZIUN,

Plaintiffs,

-v- CASE NO. 5:99-cv-194-Oc-10C

J.J. DAHL, et al.,

Defendants.
_____/

O R D E R

This case comes before the Court for consideration of several pending motions, including

three motions to dismiss (Docs. 17, 20, and 25), to which the Plaintiff has responded (Docs. 22 and 27). Upon due consideration, the Court finds that the Defendants' motions to dismiss are due to be Granted and that all remaining pending motions are therefore moot.

Background and Facts

On May 5, 1999, the *pro se* Plaintiffs initiated this action by filing a complaint (Doc. 1) in the Tampa Division of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida and brought several claims against nine named defendants, two unidentified Lake County Sheriff Department officers, and other unidentified Lake County officers. The named defendants include J.J. Dahl, an Assistant State Attorney; Rhonda Gerber, William Good, Richard Swartz, Catherine Hanson, and Welton Cadwell, Lake County Commissioners; George E. Knupp, the Sheriff of Lake County; and Ken Adams and John Guzman, deputies in the Lake County Sheriff's office. On June 25, 1999, the case was transferred to this Court (Doc. 24).

The facts, as can be discerned from the complaint, reveal the following details.
The Plaintiffs, Alicja Matczak ("Matczak") and Tadeusz Bohdziun ("Bohdzium"). Are recently naturalized United States citizens of Polish origin. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 40). On December 23, 1997, the Plaintiffs purchased a fourteen (14) acre residential lot in rural Lake County, Florida. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 5). After the purchase was finalized, the Plaintiffs attempted to inspect their property but found they could not enter because a locked gate blocked their access. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 6).

The Plaintiffs allege that Mark Chodos ("Chodos") was responsible for maintaining the locked

gate. See id. According to the Plaintiffs, Chodos informed them that the gate is located on a separate lot owned by Lake County and that he was authorized by Lake County to care for the property. See id. Chodos cited an Official Lake County Assessment Map that showed the location of the gate to be county property while depicting the Plaintiffs' lot as only ten (10) acres. The Plaintiffs asked Chodos to remove the lock or provide the key, but he refused and told them that he was "very good with guns" and threatened that the Plaintiffs "may get shot" if they attempted to enter the property. See id.

On December 30, 1997, the Plaintiffs went to the Lake County Zoning Department to apply for a building permit to install a manufactured home on their property. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 9). The Plaintiffs also inquired about the Official Lake County Assesment Map that showed their property as ten (10) acres. See id. The Zoning Inspector did not offer any explanation, but approved their plot plan and advised the Plaintiffs to report the "armed property hijacking" to the Lake County Sheriff's Department. See id.

The Plaintiffs then went to the Lake County Sheriff's Department to file a complaint against Chodos. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 10). They spoke with Detective Ken Adams ("Adams") and asked him to provide security to allow the Plaintiffs to enter their own property. (Doc. 1 ¶ 11). Adams refused and advised the Plaintiffs to file a civil law suit for possession of the land. See id. After examining the Plaintiffs' deed, Adams said, "If you believe its yours [sic] property, you can go there and cut the chain." See id. According to the Plaintiffs, Adams and the Lake County Sheriff's office ignored the death threats and have continued to refuse to provide any protection or security for the Plaintiffs. See id.

On February 7, 1998, the Plaintiffs purchased material to build a fence on their property. (Doc. 1 ¶ 15). Upon arrival at the lot, they found the gate locked, but they cut the chain and drove onto the property. See id. The Plaintiffs then began erecting a fence on the property, as well as "No Trespassing" signs. See id. While they were working on the fence, a man later identified as Darrell Judy ("Judy") approached them "screaming obscenities and death threats." (Doc. 1 at ¶ 17). Plaintiff Bohdziun pointed his gun at Judy and told him to leave their property. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 18). Judy began to leave, but stopped near the edge of the property and fired a gun in the Plaintiffs' direction. See id. The Plaintiffs then left their property to report the incident to the Lake County Sheriff's Department. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 19). Before leaving, they placed their own chain and lock on the gate. See id. After reporting the incident to the Sheriff's Department, the Plaintiffs returned to the property to find that their lock and chain had been removed. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 21). Present were Chados, Trilby Burket ("Burket"), Deputy John Guzman, and two unidentified Lake County Sheriff's Department officers. See id. Burket and Chodos had apparently been blocked by the Plaintiff's newly installed fence and could not pass through onto their properties. See id.

The Sheriff's Department officers placed the Plaintiffs in the back of their squad cars and detained them while Chodos and Burket dismantled the fence. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 22). The officers questioned the Plaintiffs about their national origin and told them that they were not allowed to fence property that they did not own. See id. Meanwhile, Judy returned to the scene and made a complaint to the officers about the Plaintiffs. Plaintiff Bohdziun was arrested for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and was held in the Lake County jail. (Doc 1 at ¶ ¶ 23-24). He was

charged with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon by Defendant J.J. Dahl, Assistant State Attorney of the Fifth Judicial Circuit of Florida. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 25). The Plaintiff alleges that he was coerced to plead guilty to the less serious charge of improper exhibition of a firearm. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 27). The Plaintiff alleges that he was "coerced to plead guilty due to the fact that [his] acts do not constitute any illegal or criminal acts at all under State of Florida laws and under United States Constitution." See id.

Based on these facts, the Plaintiffs bring the following claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § § 1981, 1982, 1985, and 3604 for deprivation of civil and human rights conferred by the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth amendments to the Constitution. The claims against Dahl arise from his refusal to prosecute for theft of real estate, uttering and forgery, armed trespassing, illegal dumping, death threats, solicitation, and attempted double murder. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 38). The Plaintiffs bring the same claims against Defendants Knupp, Adams, Guzman, and two unnamed Sheriff's Department officers for their refusal to enforce the laws. See id. In addition, the Plaintiffs claim that Defendants Knupp, Adams, and Guzman committed false imprisonment, assault and battery, armed trespassing, removal and theft of posted land notices, breaking or injuring fences, theft of fences, and official misconduct. See id.

In addition to these claims, the Plaintiffs bring claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § § 1981, 1982, 1985, and 3604 against County Commissioners Rhonda H. Gerber, William Good, Richard Swartz, Catherine Hanson, and Welton Cadwell for allowing Lake County officers to continuously discriminate against the Plaintiffs on the basis of their national origin. The Plaintiffs further allege that all defendants are in

conspiracy with Chodos, Judy, and Burket to hold and illegally use the Plaintiff's real property in violation of their civil rights. The Plaintiffs seek five million dollars in compensatory damages ($5,000,000), punitive damages, declaratory and injunctive relief, and the cost of litigation.

Standard

In passing on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court is mindful that "[d]ismissal of a claim on the basis of barebones pleadings is a precarious disposition with a high mortality rate." Int'l Erectors, Inc. V. Wilhoit Steel Erectors Rental Serv., 400 F.2d 465, 471 (5th Cir. 1968).
A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 101-02, 2L.Ed 80 (1957). *See also* Cook & Nichol, Inc. V. The Plimsoll Club, 451 F.2d 505 (5th Cir. 1971). A complaint is sufficiently plead "if it shows that the Plaintiff is entitled to any relief that the Court can grant, regardless of whether it asks for the proper relief." Dotschay v. Nat. Mut. Inc. Co., 246 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1957).

Discussion

There are three motions to dismiss that have been filed on behalf of Defendants Knupp, Adams, Guzman, Gerber, Swartz, Hanson, Cadwell, Good, and Dahl. (Docs. 17, 20 and 25). The Defendants offer various reasons in support of their motions to dismiss, but all argue that the Plaintiffs' complaint fails to allege deprivation of a right, privilege or immunity that would allow recovery under federal civil rights

statutes. The Defendants' contend that the Plaintiffs do not have a constitutional right to have law enforcement officers enforce the laws according to the Plaintiff's wishes.

The Defendants cite DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 195, 109 S. Ct. 998, 1002, 103 L.Ed. 249 (1989), in which the Supreme Court stated "nothing in the language of the Due Process Clause requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors." The Court further declared that the clause does not "impose an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that those interests do not come to harm through other means." See id.

Defendants Knupp, Adams, and Guzman also assert that the Plaintiffs claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 should be dismissed because they have not alleged sufficient facts that establish that the Plaintiffs were discriminated against on the basis of their race or that the Defendants interfered with the Plaintiffs' right to make or enforce contracts. Section 1981 is designed to prohibit intentional race discrimination in the making and enforcement of public and private contracts and allegations of discriminatory intent are essential to a claim. Ferrill v. Parker Group, Inc., 168 F.3d 468, 472 (11th Cir. 1999). Though the Plaintiffs allege that they were generally mistreated on the basis of their national origin, the Defendants argue that the facts alleged are insufficient to support a claim pursuant under § 1981.

Likewise, Defendants contend that the Plaintiffs' claims pursuant to § 1982 are insufficient. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 provides: "[a]ll citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and

personal property". The Defendants assert that the Plaintiffs have failed to allege that they were subjected to racial discrimination or that the Defendants interfered in any way with their property right.

The Defendants further contend that protection under § 1982 is not available for individuals claiming to be victims of discrimination against their national origin. See Petrone v Reading 541 F. Supp 735 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (holding that § 1981 and § 1982 do not address discrimination on grounds of national origin, and absent allegations that the Italian-American Plaintiff was perceived as nonwhite his § 1981 and § 1982 claims would be dismissed), see also Budinsky v Corning Glass Works, 425 F. Supp. 786 (W.D. Pa. 1977) and Thomas v Rohner-Gehrig & Co., 582 F. Supp. 669 (N.D. III. 1984).

With regard to the Plaintiffs claims pursuant to § 1985, the Defendants argue that they are also due to be dismissed as they fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A claim under § 1985 requires establishment of a "racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action" which aims at a deprivation of the equal enjoyment of rights secured by the law. See Jackson v. Cox, 540 F.2d 209, 210 (5th Cir. 1976).[1] The Defendants contend that the complaint lacks any allegation of a class-based discriminatory animus that was behind the Defendants' actions.

Upon a review of the complaint, the Court agrees with the reasons stated by the Defendants and concludes that the Plaintiff has failed to state any federal or consitutional claim upon which relief can be

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[1] Cases decided by the Fifth Circuit on or before September 30, 1981 are binding as precedent on the Eleventh Circuit and this Court. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F. 2d 1206, 1206 (11th Cir. 1981).

granted by this Court. The Court also notes that it would be futile to grant the Plaintiffs leave to amend the complaint. Accordingly and upon due consideration, the Defendants' motions to dismiss (Docs. 17, 20, and 25) are due to be Granted and the complaint should be dismissed.

Conclusion

Accordingly, and upon due consideration:

(1) Defendant Dahl's motion (Doc. 25) shall be deemed timely filed;

(2) the Defendants' motions to dismiss (Docs. 17, 20, and 25) are GRANTED and the complaint is DISMISSED; and

(3) the Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly, terminate all pending motions, and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED

DONE and ORDERED in Ocala, Florida, this 6th day of March, 2000.

/s/_____/
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copy to Counsel of Record
Copy to *Pro Se* parties
Copy to Jim Leanhart

FILED
"s/___".
2000 MAR 23 PM 2:25

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
OCALA DIVISION

ALICJA MATCZAK and
TADEUSZ BOHDZIUN,

Plaintiffs,

-vs- CASE NO. 5:99-cv-194-Oc-10C

J.J. DAHL, et al.,

Defendants.
_____/

ORDER

This case comes before the Court for consideration of the *pro se* Plaintiffs' motion for new trial (Doc. 45), to which the Defendant has responded (Doc. 46). The Plaintiffs' motion simply states that "[p]ursuant to Rule 59(a) and 38(a), Fed. R. Civ. P. Plaintiffs Alicja Matczak and Tadeusz Bohdziun respectfully requests [sic] the Court to grant NEW TRIAL and allow additional testimony." (Doc.45 at 1, emphasis in original).

In response, the Defendant argues that the Plaintiff's motion should be denied because it "does nothing other than make the request, but without any indication of error by this Honorable Court in its determination of facts or applications of law." (Doc.46 at 1). The Defendant further states that the Plaintiffs' motion is improper because the dismissal of this action rests on the Court's granting of the various motions to dismiss submitted by the Defendants in this case. (Doc. 46 at 1).

Accordingly, upon due consideration, the Plaintiff's motion for New Trial (Doc. 45) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DONE and ORDERED in Ocala, Florida, this 23rd day of March, 2000.

"s/_____".
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copy to Counsel of Record
Copy to *Pro Se* parties
Copy to Jim Leanhart

FILED
"s/___".
2000 APR 20 PM 3:33
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
OCALA DIVISION

ALICJA MATCZAK and
TADEUSZ BOHDZIUN,

Plaintiffs,

-vs- CASE NO. 5:99-cv-194-Oc-10C

J.J. DAHL, et al.,

Defendants.
_____/

ORDER

This case comes before the Court for consideration of the *pro se* Plaintiffs' second Motion for New Trial (Doc. 50), to which the Defendants have responded (Doc. 51, 52 and 53). As the Defendants

point out, the Plaintiffs' motion fails to demonstrate any basis for the Court's reconsideration of its prior Order (Doc. 43) dismissing this action.

Accordingly, upon due consideration, the Plaintiffs' second Motion for New Trial (Doc. 50) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DONE and ORDERED in Ocala, Florida, this 20th day of April, 2000.

"s/_____
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copy to Counsel of Record
Copy to *Pro Se* parties

FILED
2000 MAY 16 AM 9:43 "s/___".

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
OCALA DIVISION

ALICJA MATCZAK and
TADEUSZ BOHDZIUN,

Plaintiffs,

-vs- CASE NO. 5:99-cv-194-Oc-10C

J.J. DAHL, et al.,

Defendants.
_____/

ORDER

This case comes before the Court for consideration of the *pro se* Plaintiffs' Third Motion for New Trial (Doc. 55), and accompanying exhibits. The Defendants have responded (Docs. 56, 57 and 58). As the Defendants argue, the Plaintiffs' motion fails to demonstrate any basis for the Court's reconsideration of its prior Order (Doc. 43) dismissing this action.

Accordingly, upon due consideration, the Plaintiffs' Third Motion for New Trial (Doc. 55) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DONE and ORDERED in Ocala, Florida, this 16th day of May, 2000.

"s/_____".
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copy to Counsel of Record
Copy to *Pro Se* parties

UNITED STATES CODE
TITLE 28

§1254. Courts of appeals; certiorari; certified questions

Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by the following methods:
(1) By writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any civil or criminal case, before or after rendition of judgment or decree;

§1257. State courts; certiorari

(a) Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari

where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in question or where the validity of a statute of any State is drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, or where any title, right, privilege, or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution or the treaties or statutes of, or any commission held or authority exercised under, the United States.

§1291. Final decisions of district courts

The courts of appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States, the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court. The jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall be limited to the jurisdiction described in sections 1292(c) and (d) and 1295 of this title.

§1292. Interlocutory decisions

(a) Except as provided in subsections (c) and (d) of this section, the courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from:

(1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States, the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, or of the judges thereof, granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court;

(2) Interlocutory orders appointing receivers, or refusing orders to wind up receiverships or to take

steps to accomplish the purposes thereof, such as directing sales or other disposals of property;
(3) Interlocutory decrees of such district courts or the judges thereof determining the rights and liabilities of the parties to admiralty cases in which appeals from final decrees are allowed.

(b) When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals which would have jurisdiction of an appeal of such action may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application is made to it within ten days after the entry of the order: Provided, however, That application for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order.

(c) The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction -
(1) of an appeal from an interlocutory order or decree described in subsection (a) or (b) of this section in any case over which the court would have jurisdiction of an appeal under section 1295 of this title; and
(2) of an appeal from a judgment in a civil action for patent infringement which would otherwise be appealable to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and is final except for an accounting.

(d)
(1) When the chief judge of the Court of International Trade issues an order under the provisions of section 256(b) of this title, or when any judge of the Court of International Trade, in issuing any other interlocutory order, includes in the order a statement that a controlling question of law is involved with respect to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from that order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit may, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application is made to that Court within ten days after the entry of such order.

(2) When the chief judge of the United States Court of Federal Claims issues an order under section 798(b) of this title, or when any judge of the United States Court of Federal Claims, in issuing an interlocutory order, includes in the order a statement that a controlling question of law is involved with respect to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from that order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit may, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application is made to that Court within ten days after the entry of such order.

(3) Neither the application for nor the granting of an appeal under this subsection shall stay proceedings in the Court of International Trade or in the Court of Federal Claims, as the case may be, unless a stay is ordered by a judge of the Court of International Trade or of the Court of Federal Claims or by the United

States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or a judge of that court.

(4)
(A) The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction of an appeal from an interlocutory order of a district court of the United States, the District Court of Guam, the District Court of the Virgin Islands, or the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands, granting or denying, in whole or in part, a motion to transfer an action to the United States Court of Federal Claims under section 1631 of this title.

(B) When a motion to transfer an action to the Court of Federal Claims is filed in a district court, no further proceedings shall be taken in the district court until 60 days after the court has ruled upon the motion. If an appeal is taken from the district court's grant or denial of the motion, proceedings shall be further stayed until the appeal has been decided by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The stay of proceedings in the district court shall not bar the granting of preliminary or injunctive relief, where appropriate and where expedition is reasonably necessary. However, during the period in which proceedings are stayed as provided in this subparagraph, no transfer to the Court of Federal Claims pursuant to the motion shall be carried out.

(e) The Supreme Court may prescribe rules, in accordance with section 2072 of this title, to provide for an appeal of an interlocutory decision to the courts of appeals that is not otherwise provided for under subsection (a), (b), (c), or (d).

§2072. Rules of procedure and evidence; power to prescribe

(a) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States district courts (including proceedings before magistrates thereof) and courts of appeals.

(b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.

(c) Such rules may define when a ruling of a district court is final for the purposes of appeal under section 1291 of this title.

TITLE 42

§1981. Equal rights under the law

(a) Statement of equal rights

All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.

(b) "Make and enforce contracts" defined

For purposes of this section, the term "make and enforce contracts" includes the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.

(c) Protection against impairment

The rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by nongovernmental

discrimination and impairment under color of State law.

§1982. Property rights of citizens
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.

§1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.

§1985. Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights
(1) Preventing officer from performing duties
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to prevent, by force, intimidation, or threat, any person from accepting or holding any office, trust, or place of confidence under the United States, or from discharging any duties thereof; or to induce by like means any officer of the United States to leave any State, district, or place, where his duties as an officer

are required to be performed, or to injure him in his person or property on account of his lawful discharge of the duties of his office, or while engaged in the lawful discharge thereof, or to injure his property so as to molest, interrupt, hinder, or impede him in the discharge of his official duties;

(2) Obstructing justice; intimidating party, witness, or juror

If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to deter, by force, intimidation, or threat, any party or witness in any court of the United States from attending such court, or from testifying to any matter pending therein, freely, fully, and truthfully, or to injure such party or witness in his person or property on account of his having so attended or testified, or to influence the verdict, presentment, or indictment of any grand or petit juror in any such court, or to injure such juror in his person or property on account of any verdict, presentment, or indictment lawfully assented to by him, or of his being or having been such juror; or if two or more persons conspire for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating, in any manner, the due course of justice in any State or Territory, with intent to deny to any citizen the equal protection of the laws, or to injure him or his property for lawfully enforcing, or attempting to enforce, the right of any person, or class of persons, to the equal protection of the laws;

(3) Depriving persons of rights or privileges

If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or

securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws; or if two or more persons conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his support or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election of any lawfully qualified person as an elector for President or Vice President, or as a Member of Congress of the United States; or to injure any citizen in person or property on account of such support or advocacy; in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.

TITLE 18

§ 241. Conspiracy against rights

If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same; or

If two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of another, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege so secured - They shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if death results from the acts committed in

violation of this section or if such acts include kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, they shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to death.

§ 242. Deprivation of rights under color of law
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such person being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if bodily injury results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include the use, attempted use, or threatened use of a dangerous weapon, explosives, or fire, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if death results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to death.

FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 38. Jury Trial of Right
(a) Right Preserved.
The right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a

statute of the United States shall be preserved to the parties inviolate.

Rule 54. Judgments; Costs
(a) Definition; Form.
"Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree and any order from which an appeal lies. A judgment shall not contain a recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings.

Rule 55. Default

(a) Entry.
When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules and that fact is made to appear by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk shall enter the party's default.

(b) Judgment.

Judgment by default may be entered as follows:
(1) By the Clerk.
When the plaintiff's claim against a defendant is for a sum certain or for a sum which can by computation be made certain, the clerk upon request of the plaintiff and upon affidavit of the amount due shall enter judgment for that amount and costs against the defendant, if the defendant has been defaulted for failure to appear and is not an infant or incompetent person.

American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S.Treaty Series No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 entered into force July 18, 1978, *reprinted in* Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 25 (1992).

Article 1. Obligation to Respect Rights

1. The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other social condition.
2. For the purposes of this Convention, "person" means every human being.

Article 2. Domestic Legal Effects

Where the exercise of any of the rights or freedoms referred to in Article 1 is not already ensured by legislative or other provisions, the States Parties undertake to adopt, in accordance with their constitutional processes and the provisions of this Convention, such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to those rights or freedoms.

Article 3. Right to Juridical Personality

Every person has the right to recognition as a person before the law.

Article 4. Right to Life

1. Every person has the right to have his life respected. This right shall be protected by law and, in general, from the moment of conception. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.

Article 5. Right to Humane Treatment

1. Every person has the right to have his physical, mental, and moral integrity respected.

2. No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment. All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.
3. Punishment shall not be extended to any person other than the criminal.
4. Accused persons shall, save in exceptional circumstances, be segregated from convicted persons, and shall be subject to separate treatment appropriate to their status as unconvicted persons.
5. Minors while subject to criminal proceedings shall be separated from adults and brought before specialized tribunals, as speedily as possible, so that they may be treated in accordance with their status as minors.
6. Punishments consisting of deprivation of liberty shall have as an essential aim the reform and social readaptation of the prisoners.

Article 7. Right to Personal Liberty

1. Every person has the right to personal liberty and security.
2. No one shall be deprived of his physical liberty except for the reasons and under the conditions established beforehand by the constitution of the State Party concerned or by a law established pursuant thereto.
3. No one shall be subject to arbitrary arrest or imprisonment.
4. Anyone who is detained shall be informed of the reasons for his detention and shall be promptly notified of the charge or charges against him.
5. Any person detained shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to be released without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings. His

release may be subject to guarantees to assure his appearance for trial.
6. Anyone who is deprived of his liberty shall be entitled to recourse to a competent court, in order that the court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his arrest or detention and order his release if the arrest or detention is unlawful. In States Parties whose laws provide that anyone who believes himself to be threatened with deprivation of his liberty is entitled to recourse to a competent court in order that it may decide on the lawfulness of such threat, this remedy may not be restricted or abolished. The interested party or another person in his behalf is entitled to seek these remedies.
7. No one shall be detained for debt. This principle shall not limit the orders of a competent judicial authority issued for nonfulfillment of duties of support.

Article 8. Right to a Fair Trial

1. Every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal, previously established by law, in the substantiation of any accusation of a criminal nature made against him or for the determination of his rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature.
2. Every person accused of a criminal offense has the right to be presumed innocent so long as his guilt has not been proven according to law. During the proceedings, every person is entitled, with full equality, to the following minimum guarantees:
a. the right of the accused to be assisted without charge by a translator or interpreter, if he does not understand or does not speak the language of the tribunal or court;

b. prior notification in detail to the accused of the charges against him;
c. adequate time and means for the preparation of his defense;
d. the right of the accused to defend himself personally or to be assisted by legal counsel of his own choosing, and to communicate freely and privately with his counsel;
e. the inalienable right to be assisted by counsel provided by the state, paid or not as the domestic law provides, if the accused does not defend himself personally or engage his own counsel within the time period established by law;
f. the right of the defense to examine witnesses present in the court and to obtain the appearance, as witnesses, of experts or other persons who may throw light on the facts;
g. the right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself or to plead guilty; and
h. the right to appeal the judgment to a higher court.
3. A confession of guilt by the accused shall be valid only if it is made without coercion of any kind.
4. An accused person acquitted by a nonappealable judgment shall not be subjected to a new trial for the same cause.
5. Criminal proceedings shall be public, except insofar as may be necessary to protect the interests of justice.

Article 9. Freedom from Ex Post Facto Laws

No one shall be convicted of any act or omission that did not constitute a criminal offense, under the applicable law, at the time it was committed. A heavier penalty shall not be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offense was committed. If subsequent to the commission of the offense the law provides for the imposition of a lighter punishment, the guilty person shall benefit therefrom.

Article 10. Right to Compensation

Every person has the right to be compensated in accordance with the law in the event he has been sentenced by a final judgment through a miscarriage of justice.

Article 11. Right to Privacy

1. Everyone has the right to have his honor respected and his dignity recognized.
2. No one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive interference with his private life, his family, his home, or his correspondence, or of unlawful attacks on his honor or reputation.
3. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.

Article 18. Right to a Name

Every person has the right to a given name and to the surnames of his parents or that of one of them. The law shall regulate the manner in which this right shall be ensured for all, by the use of assumed names if necessary.

Article 21. Right to Property

1. Everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his property. The law may subordinate such use and enjoyment to the interest of society.
2. No one shall be deprived of his property except upon payment of just compensation, for reasons of public utility or social interest, and in the cases and according to the forms established by law.
3. Usury and any other form of exploitation of man by man shall be prohibited by law.

Article 24. Right to Equal Protection

All persons are equal before the law. Consequently, they are entitled, without discrimination, to equal protection of the law.

Article 25. Right to Judicial Protection

1. Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate his fundamental rights recognized by the constitution or laws of the state concerned or by this Convention, even though such violation may have been committed by persons acting in the course of their official duties.
2. The States Parties undertake:
a. to ensure that any person claiming such remedy shall have his rights determined by the competent authority provided for by the legal system of the state;
b. to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; and
c. to ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted

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UNITED NATIONS

Universal Declaration of Human Rights

Article I

All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.

Article 2

Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any

kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.

Article 3

Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.

Article 4

No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.

Article 5

No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Article 6

Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.

Article 7

All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.

Article 8

Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.

Article 9

No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.

Article 10

Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.

Article 11

1.Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defense.

2.No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account ~~of any act~~ or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal offence was committed.

Article 12

No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honor and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.

Article 17

1. Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others.

2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.

CONSTITUTION
OF THE
STATE OF FLORIDA
AS REVISED IN 1968 AND SUBSEQUENTLY AMENDED

SECTION 2. Basic rights.
All natural persons, female and male alike, are equal before the law and have inalienable rights, among which are the right to enjoy and defend life and liberty, to pursue happiness, to be rewarded for industry, and to acquire, possess and protect property; except that the ownership, inheritance, disposition and possession of real property by aliens ineligible for citizenship may be regulated or prohibited by law. No person shall be deprived of any right because of race, religion, national origin, or physical disability.

SECTION 4. Freedom of speech and press.
Every person may speak, write and publish sentiments on all subjects but shall be responsible for the abuse of that right. No law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions and civil actions for defamation the truth may be given in evidence. If the matter charged as defamatory is true and was published with good motives, the party shall be acquitted or exonerated.

SECTION 5. Right to assemble.
The people shall have the right peaceably to assemble, to instruct their representatives, and to petition for redress of grievances.

SECTION 8. Right to bear arms.
(a) The right of the people to keep and bear arms in defense of themselves and of the lawful authority of the state shall not be infringed, except that the manner of bearing arms may be regulated by law.

SECTION 9. Due process.
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, or be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, or be compelled in any criminal matter to be a witness against oneself.

SECTION 12. Searches and seizures.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, and against the unreasonable interception of private communications by any means, shall not be violated. No warrant shall be issued except upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly describing the place or places to be searched, the person or persons, thing or things to be seized, the communication to be intercepted, and the nature of evidence to be obtained. This right shall be construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. Articles or information obtained in violation of this right shall not be admissible in evidence if such articles or information would be inadmissible under decisions of the United States Supreme Court construing the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution.

SECTION 21. Access to courts.
The courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay.

SECTION 22. Trial by jury.
The right of trial by jury shall be secure to all and remain inviolate. The qualifications and the number of jurors, not fewer than six, shall be fixed by law.

SECTION 23. Right of privacy.
Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into the person's private life except as otherwise provided herein. This section shall not be construed to limit the public's right of access to public records and meetings as provided by law.

The 1998 Florida Statutes

790.25 Lawful ownership, possession, and use of firearms and other weapons.
(1) DECLARATION OF POLICY.--The Legislature finds as a matter of public policy and fact that it is necessary to promote firearms safety and to curb and prevent the use of firearms and other weapons in crime and by incompetent persons without prohibiting the lawful use in defense of life, home, and property, and the use by United States or state military organizations, and as otherwise now authorized by law, including the right to use and own firearms for target practice and marksmanship on target practice ranges or other lawful places, and lawful hunting and other lawful purposes.
(2) USES NOT AUTHORIZED.--
(a) This section does not authorize carrying a concealed weapon without a permit, as prohibited by ss. 790.01 and 790.02.

(b) The protections of this section do not apply to the following:
1. A person who has been adjudged mentally incompetent, who is addicted to the use of narcotics or any similar drug, or who is a habitual or chronic alcoholic, or a person using weapons or firearms in violation of ss. 790.07-790.12, 790.14-790.19, 790.22-790.24;
2. Vagrants and other undesirable persons as defined in ¹s. 856.02;
3. A person in or about a place of nuisance as defined in s. 823.05, unless such person is there for law enforcement or some other lawful purpose.
(3) LAWFUL USES.--The provisions of ss. 790.053 and 790.06 do not apply in the following instances, and, despite such sections, it is lawful for the following persons to own, possess, and lawfully use firearms and other weapons, ammunition, and supplies for lawful purposes:
(a) Members of the Militia, National Guard, Florida State Defense Force, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, organized reserves, and other armed forces of the state and of the United States, when on duty, when training or preparing themselves for military duty, or while subject to recall or mobilization;
(b) Citizens of this state subject to duty in the Armed Forces under s. 2, Art. X of the State Constitution, under chapters 250 and 251, and under federal laws, when on duty or when training or preparing themselves for military duty;
(c) Persons carrying out or training for emergency management duties under chapter 252;
(d) Sheriffs, marshals, prison or jail wardens, police officers, Florida highway patrol officers, game wardens, revenue officers, forest officials, special officers

appointed under the provisions of chapter 354, and other peace and law enforcement officers and their deputies and assistants and full-time paid peace officers of other states and of the Federal Government who are carrying out official duties while in this state;
(e) Officers or employees of the state or United States duly authorized to carry a concealed weapon;
(f) Guards or messengers of common carriers, express companies, armored car carriers, mail carriers, banks, and other financial institutions, while actually employed in and about the shipment, transportation, or delivery of any money, treasure, bullion, bonds, or other thing of value within this state;
(g) Regularly enrolled members of any organization duly authorized to purchase or receive weapons from the United States or from this state, or regularly enrolled members of clubs organized for target, skeet, or trap shooting, while at or going to or from shooting practice; or regularly enrolled members of clubs organized for modern or antique firearms collecting, while such members are at or going to or from their collectors' gun shows, conventions, or exhibits;
(h) A person engaged in fishing, camping, or lawful hunting or going to or returning from a fishing, camping, or lawful hunting expedition;
(i) A person engaged in the business of manufacturing, repairing, or dealing in firearms, or the agent or representative of any such person while engaged in the lawful course of such business;
(j) A person firing weapons for testing or target practice under safe conditions and in a safe place not prohibited by law or going to or from such place;
(k) A person firing weapons in a safe and secure indoor range for testing and target practice;
(l) A person traveling by private conveyance when the weapon is securely encased or in a public conveyance

when the weapon is securely encased and not in the person's manual possession;
(m) A person while carrying a pistol unloaded and in a secure wrapper, concealed or otherwise, from the place of purchase to his or her home or place of business or to a place of repair or back to his or her home or place of business;
(n) A person possessing arms at his or her home or place of business;
(o) Investigators employed by the several public defenders of the state, while actually carrying out official duties, provided such investigators:
1. Are employed full time;
2. Meet the official training standards for firearms established by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission as provided in s. 943.12(5) and the requirements of ss. 493.6108(1)(a) and 943.13(1)-(4); and
3. Are individually designated by an affidavit of consent signed by the employing public defender and filed with the clerk of the circuit court in the county in which the employing public defender resides.
(p) Investigators employed by the capital collateral representative, while actually carrying out official duties, provided such investigators:
1. Are employed full time;
2. Meet the official training standards for firearms as established by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission as provided in s. 943.12(1) and the requirements of ss. 493.6108(1)(a) and 943.13(1)-(4); and
3. Are individually designated by an affidavit of consent signed by the capital collateral representative and filed with the clerk of the circuit court in the county in which the investigator is headquartered.

(4) CONSTRUCTION.--This act shall be liberally construed to carry out the declaration of policy herein and in favor of the constitutional right to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes. This act is supplemental and additional to existing rights to bear arms now guaranteed by law and decisions of the courts of Florida, and nothing herein shall impair or diminish any of such rights. This act shall supersede any law, ordinance, or regulation in conflict herewith.
(5) POSSESSION IN PRIVATE CONVEYANCE.--Notwithstanding subsection (2), it is lawful and is not a violation of s. 790.01 for a person 18 years of age or older to possess a concealed firearm or other weapon for self-defense or other lawful purpose within the interior of a private conveyance, without a license, if the firearm or other weapon is securely encased or is otherwise not readily accessible for immediate use. Nothing herein contained prohibits the carrying of a legal firearm other than a handgun anywhere in a private conveyance when such firearm is being carried for a lawful use. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to authorize the carrying of a concealed firearm or other weapon on the person. This subsection shall be liberally construed in favor of the lawful use, ownership, and possession of firearms and other weapons, including lawful self-defense as provided in s. 776.012.

776.012 Use of force in defense of person.
A person is justified in the use of force, except deadly force, against another when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself or herself or another against such other's imminent use of unlawful force. However, the person is justified in the use of deadly force only if he or she reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great

bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible felony.

776.031 Use of force in defense of others.
A person is justified in the use of force, except deadly force, against another when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to prevent or terminate such other's trespass on, or other tortious or criminal interference with, either real property other than a dwelling or personal property, lawfully in his or her possession or in the possession of another who is a member of his or her immediate family or household or of a person whose property he or she has a legal duty to protect. However, the person is justified in the use of deadly force only if he or she reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible felony.

776.08 Forcible felony.
"Forcible felony" means treason; murder; manslaughter; sexual battery; carjacking; home-invasion robbery; robbery; burglary; arson; kidnapping; aggravated assault; aggravated battery; aggravated stalking; aircraft piracy; unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb; and any other felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual.

810.09 Trespass on property other than structure or conveyance.
(1)(a) A person who, without being authorized, licensed, or invited, willfully enters upon or remains in any property other than a structure or conveyance:
1. As to which notice against entering or remaining is given, either by actual communication to the offender

or by posting, fencing, or cultivation as described in s. 810.011; or

2. If the property is the unenclosed curtilage of a dwelling and the offender enters or remains with the intent to commit an offense thereon, other than the offense of trespass, commits the offense of trespass on property other than a structure or conveyance.
(b) As used in this section, the term "unenclosed curtilage" means the unenclosed land or grounds, and any outbuildings, that are directly and intimately adjacent to and connected with the dwelling and necessary, convenient, and habitually used in connection with that dwelling.
(2) (a) Except as provided in this subsection, trespass on property other than a structure or conveyance is a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
(b) If the offender defies an order to leave, personally communicated to the offender by the owner of the premises or by an authorized person, or if the offender willfully opens any door, fence, or gate or does any act that exposes animals, crops, or other property to waste, destruction, or freedom; unlawfully dumps litter on property; or trespasses on property other than a structure or conveyance, the offender commits a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
(c) If the offender is armed with a firearm or other dangerous weapon during the commission of the offense of trespass on property other than a structure or conveyance, he or she is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. Any owner or person authorized by the owner may, for prosecution purposes, take into custody and detain, in a reasonable manner, for a reasonable length of time,

any person when he or she reasonably believes that a violation of this paragraph has been or is being committed, and that the person to be taken into custody and detained has committed or is committing such violation. In the event a person is taken into custody, a law enforcement officer shall be called as soon as is practicable after the person has been taken into custody. The taking into custody and detention in compliance with the requirements of this paragraph does not result in criminal or civil liability for false arrest, false imprisonment, or unlawful detention.

(d) The offender commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084, if the property trespassed is a construction site that is legally posted and identified in substantially the following manner: "THIS AREA IS A DESIGNATED CONSTRUCTION SITE, AND ANYONE WHO TRESPASSES ON THIS PROPERTY COMMITS A FELONY."

(e) The offender commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084, if the property trespassed upon is commercial horticulture property and the property is legally posted and identified in substantially the following manner: "THIS AREA IS DESIGNATED COMMERCIAL PROPERTY FOR HORTICULTURE PRODUCTS, AND ANYONE WHO TRESPASSES ON THIS PROPERTY COMMITS A FELONY."

(f) Any person who in taking or attempting to take any animal described in s. 372.001(3) or (4), or in killing, attempting to kill, or endangering any animal described in s. 585.01(13) knowingly propels or causes to be propelled any potentially lethal projectile over or across private land without authorization commits trespass, a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. For purposes of this paragraph, the term "potentially lethal

projectile" includes any projectile launched from any firearm, bow, crossbow, or similar tensile device. This section shall not apply to any governmental agent or employee acting within the scope of his or her official duties.

812.012 Definitions. As used in ss. 812.012-812.037:
(1) "Dealer in property" means any person in the business of buying and selling property.
(2) "Obtains or uses" means any manner of:
(a) Taking or exercising control over property.
(b) Making any unauthorized use, disposition, or transfer of property.
(c) Obtaining property by fraud, willful misrepresentation of a future act, or false promise.
(d)1. Conduct previously known as stealing; larceny; purloining; abstracting; embezzlement; misapplication; misappropriation; conversion; or obtaining money or property by false pretenses, fraud, or deception; or
2. Other conduct similar in nature.
(3) "Property" means anything of value, and includes:
(a) Real property, including things growing on, affixed to, and found in land.
(b) Tangible or intangible personal property, including rights, privileges, interests, and claims.
(c) Services.
(4) "Property of another" means property in which a person has an interest upon which another person is not privileged to infringe without consent, whether or not the other person also has an interest in the property.
(5) "Services" means anything of value resulting from a person's physical or mental labor or skill, or from the use, possession, or presence of property, and includes:
(a) Repairs or improvements to property.
(b) Professional services.

(c) Private, public, or government communication, transportation, power, water, or sanitation services.
(d) Lodging accommodations.
(e) Admissions to places of exhibition or entertainment.
(6) "Stolen property" means property that has been the subject of any criminally wrongful taking.
(7) "Traffic" means:
(a) To sell, transfer, distribute, dispense, or otherwise dispose of property.
(b) To buy, receive, possess, obtain control of, or use property with the intent to sell, transfer, distribute, dispense, or otherwise dispose of such property.
(8) "Enterprise" means any individual, sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, business trust, union chartered under the laws of this state, or other legal entity, or any unchartered union, association, or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.
(9) "Value" means value determined according to any of the following:
(a)1. Value means the market value of the property at the time and place of the offense or, if such cannot be satisfactorily ascertained, the cost of replacement of the property within a reasonable time after the offense.
2. The value of a written instrument that does not have a readily ascertainable market value, in the case of an instrument such as a check, draft, or promissory note, is the amount due or collectible or is, in the case of any other instrument which creates, releases, discharges, or otherwise affects any valuable legal right, privilege, or obligation, the greatest amount of economic loss that the owner of the instrument might reasonably suffer by virtue of the loss of the instrument.

3. The value of a trade secret that does not have a readily ascertainable market value is any reasonable value representing the damage to the owner, suffered by reason of losing an advantage over those who do not know of or use the trade secret.
(b) If the value of property cannot be ascertained, the trier of fact may find the value to be not less than a certain amount; if no such minimum value can be ascertained, the value is an amount less than $100.
(c) Amounts of value of separate properties involved in thefts committed pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct, whether the thefts are from the same person or from several persons, may be aggregated in determining the grade of the offense.

812.014 Theft.
(1) A person commits theft if he or she knowingly obtains or uses, or endeavors to obtain or to use, the property of another with intent to, either temporarily or permanently:
(a) Deprive the other person of a right to the property or a benefit from the property.
(b) Appropriate the property to his or her own use or to the use of any person not entitled to the use of the property.
(2)(a)1. If the property stolen is valued at $100,000 or more; or
2. If the offender commits any grand theft and:
a. In the course of committing the offense the offender uses a motor vehicle as an instrumentality, other than merely as a getaway vehicle, to assist in committing the offense and thereby damages the real property of another; or
b. In the course of committing the offense the offender causes damage to the real or personal property of another in excess of $1,000, the offender commits grand theft in the first degree, punishable as a felony

of the first degree, as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(b) If the property stolen is valued at $20,000 or more, but less than $100,000, the offender commits grand theft in the second degree, punishable as a felony of the second degree, as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(c) It is grand theft of the third degree and a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084, if the property stolen is:
1. Valued at $300 or more, but less than $5,000.
2. Valued at $5,000 or more, but less than $10,000.
3. Valued at $10,000 or more, but less than $20,000.
4. A will, codicil, or other testamentary instrument.
5. A firearm.
6. A motor vehicle, except as provided in [1]subparagraph (2)(a).
7. Any commercially farmed animal, including any animal of the equine, bovine, or swine class, or other grazing animal, and including aquaculture species raised at a certified aquaculture facility. If the property stolen is aquaculture species raised at a certified aquaculture facility, then a $10,000 fine shall be imposed.
8. Any fire extinguisher.
9. Any amount of citrus fruit consisting of 2,000 or more individual pieces of fruit.
10. Taken from a designated construction site identified by the posting of a sign as provided for in s. 810.09(2)(d).
(d) It is grand theft of the third degree and a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084, if the property stolen is valued at $100 or more, but less than $300, and is taken from a dwelling as defined in s. 810.011(2) or from the unenclosed curtilage of a dwelling pursuant to s. 810.09(1).

(e) Except as provided in paragraph (d), if the property stolen is valued at $100 or more, but less than $300, the offender commits petit theft of the first degree, punishable as a misdemeanor of the first degree, as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
(3)(a) Theft of any property not specified in subsection (2) is petit theft of the second degree and a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
(b) A person who commits petit theft and who has previously been convicted of any theft commits a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
(c) A person who commits petit theft and who has previously been convicted two or more times of any theft commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
(d)1. Every judgment of guilty or not guilty of a petit theft shall be in writing, signed by the judge, and recorded by the clerk of the circuit court. The judge shall cause to be affixed to every such written judgment of guilty of petit theft, in open court and in the presence of such judge, the fingerprints of the defendant against whom such judgment is rendered. Such fingerprints shall be affixed beneath the judge's signature to such judgment. Beneath such fingerprints shall be appended a certificate to the following effect: "I hereby certify that the above and foregoing fingerprints on this judgment are the fingerprints of the defendant, _____, and that they were placed thereon by said defendant in my presence, in open court, this the _____ day of _____, 19_____."
Such certificate shall be signed by the judge, whose signature thereto shall be followed by the word "Judge."
2. Any such written judgment of guilty of a petit theft, or a certified copy thereof, is admissible in evidence in

the courts of this state as prima facie evidence that the fingerprints appearing thereon and certified by the judge are the fingerprints of the defendant against whom such judgment of guilty of a petit theft was rendered.
(4) Failure to comply with the terms of a lease when the lease is for a term of 1 year or longer shall not constitute a violation of this section unless demand for the return of the property leased has been made in writing and the lessee has failed to return the property within 7 days of his or her receipt of the demand for return of the property. A demand mailed by certified or registered mail, evidenced by return receipt, to the last known address of the lessee shall be deemed sufficient and equivalent to the demand having been received by the lessee, whether such demand shall be returned undelivered or not.

839.25 Official misconduct.
(1) "Official misconduct" means the commission of the following act by a public servant, with corrupt intent to obtain a benefit for himself or herself or another or to cause unlawful harm to another: knowingly falsifying, or causing another to falsify, any official record or official document.
(2) "Corrupt" means done with knowledge that act is wrongful and with improper motives.
(3) Official misconduct under this section is a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED

No. 001362 FEB 28 2001

OFFICE OF

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Alicja Matczak, et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

J.J. Dahl, et al.,

Respondents.

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Eleventh Circuit

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Alicja Matczak & Tadeusz Bohdziun
4725-B Coquina Key Drive S.E.
Saint Petersburg, Fl 33705
Tel. (727) 896-2106

Pro Se Petitioners

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1746 I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
I hereby certify that 40 (forty) true and correct copies of the foregoing Petition for Writ of Certiorari and 40 (forty) true and correct copies of the foregoing Appendix to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari and 40 (forty) true and correct copies of this Certificate of Service has been furnished for filing by first class U.S. mail on this 25 day of February 2001 to: Supreme Court Of The United States, 1 First Street, N. E., Washington, DC 20543. I hereby certify that all parties required to be served have been served.
Executed on February 25, 2001.

Alicja Matczak

Tadeusz Bohdziun
4725 – B Coquina Key Drive SE
St. Petersburg, FL 33705
TEL. (727) 896-2106

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1746 I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
I hereby certify that 3 (three) true and correct copies of the foregoing Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Appendix to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari and this Certificate of Service has been furnished by first class U.S. mail on this 25 day of February 2001 to:

1. Joseph H. Lee, Assistant Attorney General, Florida Bar # 0052809, Attorney for respondent J.J. Dahl, Westwood Center, 2002 N. Lois Ave, Suite 700, Tampa, FL 33607. Tel. (1-813) 871- 7828

2. Henry W. Jewett, II, and Esq., Fla. Bar No: 380024, Attorney for respondents Gerber, Good, Swartz, Hanson and Cadwell, 201 E. Pine Street, 15th Fl, Orlando, Florida 32801. Tel. (1-407) 839-0120

3. Carol A. Falvey, Fla. Bar No: 0600740, Attorney for respondents Knupp, Adams, Guzman, P.O. Box 2720, Ocala, Florida 34478-2720. Tel. (1-352) 732 - 9252

4. Loren E. Levy, Fla Bar No. 0814441, Attorney for respondents Knupp, Adams, Guzman, 1828 Riggins Road, Tallahassee, Florida 32308. Tel. (1-850) 219-0220

I hereby certify that all parties required to be served have been served.

Executed on February 25, 2001.



Alicja Matczak



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